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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

SUGARHOUSE FINANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REHEARING

vs.
EUGENE L. ANDERSON and
COLLEEN W. ANDERSON,

Case No. 16462

Defendants-Respondents.
---0000000---

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Sugarhouse Finance Company, plaintiff-appellant, respectfully petitions this Court for a rehearing of the decision
in the above referenced matter filed April 15, 1980.
The issue before this Court on appeal was the validity
and enforceability of an alleged accord and satisfaction to a
judgment entered in favor of appellant in 1976.
by

In an opinion

Justice Hall, the Court held:
(a} Defendant's petition for judicial relief from
plaintiff's judgment was procedurally proper and properly placed the issue before the trial court;
(b} the accord and satisfaction was supported by
adequate consideration; and
(c} defendant's failure to state that he owned
property located in Sevier County and failed to disclose the sale of a portion thereof did not render the
accord and satisfaction voidable by reason of fraudulent inducement.

Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing addresses the Court's holding with respect to (b} and (c} above only.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 7, 1976, plaintiff filed a complaint against
defendant for non-payment of a promissory note. Judgment thereon was rendered in favor of plain ti ff on December 17, 1976, in
the amount of $2,423.86, plus interest, costs, and attorney's
fees.

A copy of the judgment was docketed by plaintiff in

Sevier County, defendants' county of residence.
On January 29, 1979, plaintiff served defendants witl
an Order in Supplemental Proceedings, ordering them to appear
in court on February 29, 1979, and answer questions
their property.

concerni~

def~

A few days after receiving this notice,

dant Eugene Anderson (hereafter "defendant") met with the President of sugarhouse Finance Company to settle the judgment previously entered.

Defendant Eugene Anderson informed plaintiff

of the existence of numerous outstanding obligations against
him, including medical expenses incurred pursuant to treatment
for injuries sustained in an autoll'K)bile accident in 1978.

De-

fendant asserted that he was contemplating bankruptcy and such
a measure would result in plaintiff's judgment being discharged
(Supreme Court opinion, p. 1).

After some discussion about

defendants' ability to pay the amount due and owing on the
judgment, Neuman C. Petty, acting for the plaintiff, agreed to
accept the sum of $2,200 in full settlement and satisfaction of
the amount remaining to be paid on the judgment (Finding 4 of
the Trial Court, R. 90).

Defendant Eugene L. Anderson then

made and delivered his check in the sum of $2,200 to said Neuman C. Petty as full payment of the settlement amount.
( 2)
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The

check was drawn on Zions First National Bank, Salina, Utah, and
the purpose of payment was stated on the check in the following
language: "Payment in full judgment civil #236207" (Finding s
of the Trial Court, R. 90).

Defendant issued a check for this

amount, asking plaintiff, however, not to negotiate it immediately, there being some uncertainty as to the sufficiency of
funds in the account to cover it (Supreme Court opinion, p. 1).
At the time the defendant Eugene Anderson was served
with the Supplemental Order, he was anticipating the closing of
a sale of real property in which he had a one-half interest and
from which he was to receive $2,000 after payment of the underlying indebtedness (Finding 6 of the Trial Court, R. 91).

The

sale was actually completed before Eugene Anderson met with
plaintiff, and the title company had not disbursed any money to
defendants because of plaintiff's judgment (Tr. 16, 17 and 18).
Defendant Eugene L. Anderson knew that plaintiff's
judgment had been docketed as a judgment lien upon all real
property belonging to defendants in which defendants had an
interest in Sevier County (Finding 7 of the Trial Court, R.
91).

Defendant Eugene L. Anderson did not disclose to Presi-

dent of plaintiff the fact that he had an interest in property,
that the property had been sold, and that he was anticipating
the closing of the sale of property and was to receive the sum
of $2,000 from the sale (Finding 8 of the Trial Court, R. 91).
Subsequent to these negotiations, plaintiff received a
telephone call from a title company indicating that defendant
was in the process of selling a parcel of real property (R.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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116).

The title company requested a release from the Sugar-

house Finance Company judgment (R. 116).

Plaintiff declined to

provide the title company with the requested release

(R. 116).

On the morning of February 2, 1979, Sugarhouse returned the check for $2,200.00 to defendant by mail
116).

(R. 91,

Later that same date, defendant telephoned Sugarhouse

(R. 91, 115-116).

Plaintiff informed defendant that his check

had been returned and that Sugarhouse would not accept the
check as settlement of the judgment as defendant had not

be~

candid with him regarding defendant's financial status during
their settlement negotiations

(R. 91, 100, 111, 117).

Defen-

dant received the check by mail on February 3, 1979 (R. 38).
Defendant thereafter filed a motion in the original
action, asking that the court order plaintiff to comply with
the terms of the agreement of settlement.

Hearing on the mo-

tion was convened on March 13, 1979, at the conclusion of which
the motion was granted and the plaintiff was ordered upon receipt of the $2, 200 payment, to file a satisfaction of judgment
with the court.

It is from this order that plaintiff appealed.

POINT I. THIS COURT HAS IMPROPERLY SUBSTITUTED ITS
FINDINGS FOR THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT.
A.

The Trial Court Made No Finding Of A Loan.

The trial court made no finding that defendants had
negotiated a loan and that such loan was the source of funds ~
be paid plaintiff.

The trial court's findings regarding the

check delivered to plaintiff were

(1)

that "defendant then re-

quested that Mr. Petty retain the check for two days while he

( 4)
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made arrangements for the check to clear the bank," and (2)
"two days later ... defendant notified Neuman

c.

Petty by tele-

phone that arrangements had been made for the check to clear
the bank" (Findings 10 and 11, R. 91).

The trial court's find-

ings did not include findings as to the "arrangements," whether
from the defendants' own funds or from some other source.
This Court is required to defer to the findings of the
fact finder rather than substitute its judgment.

Carnesecca v.

Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708 (Utah 1977).
In contrast to the findings of the trial court, this
Cour t s ta t ed :
Pursuant to the parties' conversation of January 31,
1979, defendant agreed that, for a release of the
judgment upon payment of a lesser agreed amount, he
would negotiate a loan with a third party to enable
him to pay off the substitute obligation immediately.
(Supreme Court opinion, p. 4., emphasis added.)
We note that, in the present case, defendant agreed to
incur additional indebtedness pursuant to the terms of
the accord, in reliance on plaintiff's promise to
accept immediate payment of a lesser amount in full
satisfaction of the underlying obligation. (Supreme
Court op in ion, p. 5., emphasis added.)
The foregoing findings are inconsistent with those of the trial
court.

As such, this Court has substituted its judgment for

findings of the trial court, the finder of fact.
error.

This is

Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, supra.
Rules of appellate review also require this Court to

review the evidence in the light most favorable to the successful party at the trial court.

There is evidence in the record

to the effect that Eugene Anderson, after his conversation with

( 5.)
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plaintiff, discussed with Zions First National Bank honoring
defendant's check issued to plaintiff (Tr. 5, 13-14, 20; see
Appendix A).

This evidence was not reduced to any finding by

the trial court.

However, if this Court may consider this evj.

dence,

it clearly shows that no loan was made to the defen-

dant.

Thus the consideration relied upon by this Court in

opinion has failed.

i~

The evidence, viewed in the light rrost

favorable to defendants, shows the arrangements made by defendant with Zions National Bank were that the bank would honor
defendant's check when it was presented for payment.

Had the

check been presented for payment, the bank would have made a
loan to defendants.

However, the check was never presented to

the bank for payment and therefore no loan was ever made to
defendants.

Thus the supposed consideration to support the

accord and satisfaction failed.
B.

The Trial Court Made No Finding That Defendants

Agreed To Obtain A Loan.
The parties agreed that plaintiff would accept the surr
of $2, 200 in full settlement and satisfaction of the judgment,
whereupon defendant made and delivered his check in said sum
(Findings 5 and 6, R. 90).

The agreement was for defendants tc

pay what they were already legally obligated to pay plaintiff,
which does not constitute new or adequate consideration.

Cor·

bin on Contracts, §§175 and 1281.
Notwithstanding the

absence of any finding by the

trial court of an agreement to obtain a loan, this Court in it 5
opinion at least twice referred to such an agreement.
(6)
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See

Point I.A, above.

This Court should not now find what the

trial court did not find.
By the findings of the trial court the defendants
agreed only to do what they were already obligated to do.
new consideration was given.

No

The agreement was not binding on

plaintiff since not supported by new or adequate consideration.
Even if the agreement were that defendant would obtain
a loan from the bank, defendant did not fulfill the promise or
agreement because defendant, at roost, arranged for the bank to
honor his check when presented for payment.

The check was

never presented; thus, the loan was never made.
C.

The Trial Court Made No Finding Of Detriment Or

Injustice To The Defendants.
In its opinion, this Court relies on Section 90 of the
Restatement of Contracts which is as follows:
A promise which the promissor should reasonably expect
to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promissee and
which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of
the promise.
There is no evidence to support a finding of detriment
or injustice to the defendants.

Defendants suffered no legal

detriment since no loan was ever made to them by the bank.
Enforcement of the promise, however, under such circumstances,
rather than avoiding injustice to the defendants, results in
injustice to plaintiff.

Illustration 4 of Section 90 of Re-

statement of Contracts is illustrative:

( 7)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A promises B $5,000, knowing that B desires thats~
for the purchase of Blackacre. Induced thereby, 8
secures without any payment an option to buy Blackacre. A then tells B that he withdraws his promise.
A's promise is not binding.
This illustration could be placed in the context of the

pres~t

case as follows:
Plaintiff promises defendant to accept $2, 200 from
defendant as full satisfaction for plaintiff's judgment against defendant which exceeds $4,000 with interest, attorney's fees and costs. Induced there~,
defendant issues a check for $2,200 which defendant
informs plaintiff will not be honored upon presentment
until defendant advises plaintiff otherwise. Defendant obtains an agreement from the bank upon which the
check is drawn to honor the check. Plaintiff then
tells defendant that the promise is withdrawn. Plain·
tiff's promise is not binding.
Defendant has suffered no detriment.
to the bank.

Defendant is not indebted

Defendant remains in precisely the same position

he was in before he met with plaintiff and before he

obta~~

the bank's commitment to honor the check.
Since the trial court made no finding of detriment and
since there is no evidence to support such a finding, the
agreement was not supported by consideration.

This Court

should so hold.
POINT II. THE BURDEN OF PROVING AN ACCORD AND
SATISFACTION WAS ON DEFENDANTS; THIS COURT
PLACED THE BURDEN ON PLAINTIFF
Plaintiff submits that the burden of proving an accord
and satisfaction is on the party claiming it. Rule 8, u.R.c.P.
A sufficient defense thereto is a showing that it was not
entered into fairly and honestly.

1 Am. Jur. 2d, Accord and

Satisfaction, §24 at 322-23, citing Ralph A. Badger & co. v.

(8)
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Fidelity Building and Loan Association, 94 Utah 97, 75 P.2d 669
(1938).

The burden of proof is stated:
Accord and satisfaction is properly an affirmative defense; it must be specifically pleaded and the
burden of proof with respect to every element of it is
on the party alleging it as a defense.
(A. Corbin,
Co~bin on Contracts, §1280 at 134-5 (1962); footnote
omitted.)

Plaintiff submits that the burden of establishing an accord and
satisfaction was upon the defendant and that the Trial Court's
findings, especially 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9, conclusively establish
that the accord and satisfaction was not consummated fairly and
honestly.

Instead, this Court has placed upon plaintiff the

burden of establishing fraud.

Although that issue is discussed

in Points III and IV, plaintiff submits that is an improper
burden for plaintiff in this case and this Court's analysis,
relieving defendants of the burden which is theirs, is erroneous.
POINT III. DEFENDANTS HAD A DUTY TO DISCLOSE
THAT THE TITLE COMPANY WAS HOLDING MONEY PENDING
THE RESOLUTION OF PLAINTIFF'S JUDGMENT.
A.

The Particular Circumstances in this Case Imposed

Upon Defendant a Duty to Speak.
Defendant Eugene L. Anderson was served with a motion
and order in Supplemental Proceedings requiring him to personally appear before the Trial Court on February 20, 1979.

As

such, he was under court order to appear and testify regarding
his property.

Defendant Anderson was anticipating the closing

of a sale of real property in which he had a one-half interest
as a tenant in common, and from which he was to receive $2,000
( 9)
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after payment of the underlying indebtedness
·90).

(Finding 6, R.

Defendant knew that plaintiff's judgment had been docket-

ed as a judgment lien upon all real property belonging to defendants or in which they had an interest in Sevier County
(Finding 7, R. 90).

The purchase pr ice for the property had

actually been received by the title company, and the amount
required to obtain a conveyance of the property being sold from
a larger parcel which defendant was purchasing had been paid.
The $2,000 that was to be the defendant's share from the sale
was being held by the title company because of plaintiff's
judgment (Tr. 17, 19).

In that sense, the money being held

actually belonged to plaintiff, or at least plaintiff had a
claim upon it, as a result of its judgment lien.
To be valid, a contract of accord and satisfaction
must have been consummated fairly and honestly.

1 Am.Jur.2d

Accord and Satisfaction § 24 at 322-323, citing Ralph A. Badger
&

Co. v. Fidelity Building

669

(Utah 1938).

&

Loan Ass'n., 94 Utah 97, 75 P.2d

The agreement defendants seek to hold plain-

tiff to was not consummated fairly and honestly.

Defendant was

not only in a superior position to know, but actually knew, the
facts which would have a direct bearing on plaintiff's agreement with defendants, and defendant did not disclose the facts.
Because defendant knew the title company was holding
money because of plaintiff's judgment lien, defendant had a
duty to disclose such fact to plaintiff, which defendant knew
was without knowledge of such fact.

(10)
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Where the particular circu~stances impose on a person
a duty to speak and he deliberately remains silent
his silence is equivalent to a false representatio~.
37 C.J.S. Fraud §16a.
The circumstances which impose on a person a duty to
speak may arise in a business transaction, where parties are
dealing at arms-length.

For example, in Obde v. Schlemeyer,

353 P.2d 672 (Wash. 1960), plaintiffs initiated an action to
recover damages for the alleged fraudulent concealment of
termite infestation in an apartment house purchased by them
from the defendants.

The trial court found the building was

infested at the time of purchase, that defendants were apprised of the termite condition but did not disclose the condition to plaintiffs.

On appeal the defendants urged that they

had no duty to inform the plaintiffs of the termite condition.
The Washington Supreme Court acknowledged that the parties were
dealing at arms-length, but nonetheless found, under the circumstances, a duty to disclose the condition.

The Court reach-

ed this result even though the evidence showed that the purchasers asked no questions respecting the possibility of termites.
Similarly, in Sorrel v. Young, 491 P.2d 1312 (Wash.
App. 1971), relying on a standard of "justice, equity and
fair-dealing," attributed to Obde v. Schlemeyer, the Court held
fraud by non-disclosure of the existence of a land fill where:
(1)
A vendor, knowing that the land has been filled,
fails to disclose that fact to a purchaser of the.property, and (2) the purchaser is unaware of the existence of the fill because either he has had no oppor-

(11)
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tunity to inspect the property, or the existence of
the fill is not apparent or readily ascertainable a.
(3) the value of the property is materially affectednc
by the existence of the fill.
Of note is the fact that the buyer made no inquiry concerning
the fill.
1966),

See also Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 415 P.2d 698 (Idaho

(non-disclosure of known defects in the construction of

a home).
Defendant's duty to disclose also arises because of
the Order in Supplemental Proceedings.

Defendant was under

court order to appear and testify under oath regarding this
property.

Defendant knew he would be required to testify re-

garding his property, including the fact of the sale.

There

can be no dispute that the disclosure of the property and the
sale of a portion thereof would have had an effect on plaintiff's willingness to enter into an agreement to accept less
than defendants owed.

In effect, defendant withheld or con-

cealed the facts to reach a settlement with plaintiff so he
would not have to appear for the Order in Supplemental
ings.

Pro~ed-

This is an affront on the power of the trial court,

which should not be condoned.
B.

Having Made Representations, Defendant was Under'

Duty to Reveal, Fully and Fairly, the Facts.
The trial court found:
After some discussion about defendants' ability to~
the amount due and owing on the judgment, the [plain·
tiff's president], acting for the plaintiff, agreed.to
accept the sum of $2,200 in full settlement and satisfaction of the amount remaining to be paid on the
judgment.
(Finding 4, R. 90, emphasis added.)
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(12)

However, defendant:
. . . did not disclose to president of plaintiff the
fact that he had an interest in the property, that the
property had been sold, and that he was anticipating
the closing of the sale of property and that defendant
Eugene L. Anderson was to receive the sum of $2,000
from the sale thereof.
(Finding 8, R. 91.)
In Russ v. Brown, 529 P.2d 765 (Idaho 1974), the court
stated the widely accepted rule that in the sale of property,
"although one may not be required to make representations regarding his property, once undertaking to do so, he must fully
disclose."

Having discussed water-rights with their prospec-

tive buyers, the sellers were obligated to reveal, fully and
fairly, all facts to the prospective purchasers, including past
and pending water disputes with an adjoining land owner and his
predecessors.

This rule is stated at 37 C.J.S. Fraud §16c:

Where one person seeks information from another, the
latter may either refuse to give any information or he
must make a full and truthful disclosure which shall
have no tendency to deceive or mislead. One who conveys a false impression by the disclosure of some
facts and the concealment of others is guilty of
fraud, although his statement is true as far as it
goes.
(Emphasis added.)
There is little question that the plaintiff was seeking information from defendant.

They discussed his financial

situation for an hour-and-a-half.
ering bankruptcy.

He indicated he was consid-

He told plaintiff of his medical expenses.

The trial court found plaintiff and defendant discussed "defendants' ability to pay the amount due and owing on the judgment
... " (Finding 4, R. 90).

This alone required defendant to

give a complete disclosure of his financial condition, includ-

(13)
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ing the $2,000 he was expecting.

In view of defendants' inter-

est in the property, which had ripened into money which was oot
being disbursed to defendants because of plaintiff's judgment,
defendant was under an obligation to make a full and truthful
disclosure, including the ownership of property, the sale
thereof and the fact that money was being withheld from defendant because of plaintiff's judgment lien.
In Deardorf v. Rosenbuch, 206 P.2d 996

(Okla. 1949),

plaintiff purchased a one-acre mineral interest which was undeveloped.

She was subsequently approached for the

conveyan~

of her interest for a nominal sum, without the disclosure that
upon the premises there was one producing oil well and two
others were being drilled.

Although plaintiff was without

knowledge of the producing oil wells upon the property, defendants contended they said nothing to mislead plaintiff and she
made the sale of her own free will in an arms-length transaction.

Al though the negotiations were carried on by correspon·

dence, the wells were clearly open to the view of anyone inspecting the premises.

The Court stated:

In the opinion of this Court to confirm as true anothers false impression concerning a material fact is
no less a false representation of such fact as if made
directly in order to create the false impression. The
fact that there was production was the moving cause of
defendant's seeking the conveyance.
The absence of
plaintiff's knowledge was relied on as an inducement
to plaintiff's executing the conveyance for a nominal
consideration. There is no need to weigh the value of
each of the several statements in the letter when it
is manifest that the letter as a whole is expressive
of a scheme to capitalize on the ignorance of another.
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C.

Defendant Had a Duty to Speak Because the Facts

were Not Equally Knowable to Both Parties.
An arms-length transaction does not eliminate a party's duty, under certain circumstances, to disclose known facts
to the other party:
Where the parties deal at arms-length, there is no
duty of disclosure where the facts are equally within
the means of knowledge of both parties. If a fact is
peculiarly within the knowledge of one party and of
such a nature that the other party is justified in
assuming its non-existence, there is a duty of disclosure. Although there is authority to the effect
that knowledge that another is acting under a misapprehension of fact does not impose a duty to speak,
it is generally held that a deliberate failure to
correct a delusion may constitute fraud. 37 C.J.S.,
Fraud §l6b.
This Court cites the foregoing rule to the effect that where
the facts are reasonably within the knowledge of both parties
there is no duty of disclosure.

The_ rule, accurately quoted,

is slightly different:
Where the facts are equally within the means and
knowledge of both parties, there is no duty of
disclosure.
(Emphasis added.)
In the present case, the facts were not equally within the
means of knowledge of both parties, the plaintiff having no way
of ascertaining the sale of plaintiff's property and the fact
that the title company was withholding money from defendants
because of plaintiff's lien.
In Elder v. Clausen, 384 P.2d 802 (Utah 1963), the
defendant sold to plaintiffs a farm which had been quarantined
for a noxious weed.

Defendant showed the weed to plaintiffs,

advising plaintiffs that the weed ought to be sprayed, but at
no time did defendant advise plaintiffs of the quarantine.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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This Court stated:
We conclude that here there was a suppression of the
truth, which the party with superior knowledge had a
duty to disclose, which amounted to fraud.l

lThe Court cited the following authority in support of
this view:
"One of the fundamental tenets of the Anglo-American
law of fraud is that fraud may be committed by the suppression
of the truth * * * as well as the suggestion of falsehood * * •

*."

"Silence, in order to be an actionable fraud, must
relate to a material matter known to the party and which it is
his legal duty to communicate to the other contracting party,
whether the duty arises from a relation of trust, from confidence, inequality of condition and knowledge, or other attendant circumstances * * *."
"The principle is basic in the law of fraud as it relates to nondisclosure that a charge of fraud is maintainable
where a party who knows material facts is under a duty, under
the circumstances, to speak and disclose his information, but
remains silent * *."
"Al though the pertinent inquiry in any case where
fraud on the basis of nondisclosure is asserted is whether,
upon any particular occasion, it was the duty of the person~
speak on pain of being guilty of a fraud by reason of his silence, except in broad terms the law does not attempt to define
the occasions when a duty to speak arises. On the contrary,
there has been adopted, as a leading principle, the proposition
that whether a duty to speak exists is determinable by reference to all the circumstances of the case and by comparing the
facts not disclosed with the object and end in view by the contracting parties.
The difficulty is not so much in stating ~e,
general principles of law, which are pretty well understood, u
in applying the law to particular groups of facts * * *."
"Knowledge that the other party to a contemplated
transaction is acting under a mistaken belief as to certain
facts is a factor in determining that a duty of disclosure is
owing. There is much authority to the effect that if one party
to a contract or transaction has superior knowledge, or knowledge which is not within the fair and rasonable reach of the
other party and which he could not discover by the exercise of
reasonable diligence, or means of knowledge which· are not open
to both parties alike, he is under a legal obligation to speak,
and his silence constitutes fraud, especially when the other
party relies upon him to communicate to him the true state of
facts to enable him to judge of the expediency of the bar-.
i
gain."
(Emphasis added.
Footnotes and the Court's emphasis
omitted.)

1

(16)
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I

I

JI

In summary of the foregoing Points A, B and

c of Point

III, there are circumstances in business or arms-length transactions where there is a duty of disclosure.

In warner Con-

struction Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 466 P.2d 996 (Cal.
1970), the Supreme Court of California stated:
In transactions which do not involve fiduciary or
confidential relations, a cause of action for non-disclosure of material facts may arise in at least three
instances: (1) the defendant makes representations but
does not disclose facts which materially qualify the
facts disclosed, or which render his disclosure likely
to mislead; (2) the facts are known or accessible only
to defendant, and defendant knows they are not known
to or reasonably discoverable by the plaintiff; (3)
the defendant actively conceals discov~ry from the
plaintiff.
(Footnotes omitted.)
Instances (1) and (2) clearly apply to the facts of this case.
This Court should have found that defendants had a
duty to disclose to plaintiff, and having breached the duty,
plaintiff was entitled to rescind the agreement.
POINT IV. DEFENDANTS STATEMENTS WERE MISLEADING
AND MISREPRESENTED THE FACTS AND LAW;
DEFENDANTS BANKRUPTCY WOULD NOT HAVE DISCHARGED
PLAINTIFF'S JUDGMENT LIEN UPON THE REAL PROPERTY.
In the course of the conversation between plaintiff
and defendant regarding settlement of the judgment against defendants, Eugene Anderson "asserted that he was contemplating
bankruptcy, and that such a measure would result in plaintfff 's
judgment being discharged."

Plaintiff's judgment had been doc-

keted as a judgment lien upon all real property belonging to
defendants or in which they had an interest in Sevier County.
This was the only judgment lien docketed against defendant's
real property.

Defendants statement regarding the effect of
(17)
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bankruptcy upon plaintiff's judgment was erroneous.

In terms

of the bankruptcy law, plaintiff was a secured creditor, its
claim secured by a judgment lien on defendant's real property.
Bankruptcy would not discharge the judgment lien.

See 11

U.S.C. §§506 and 724.
This clearly brings the defendant's statements

with~

the rule stated in Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 423 P.2d 659
(Utah 196 7) :
Where one having a pecuniary interest in a transaction, is in a superior position to know material
facts, and carelessly or negligently makes a false
representation concerning them, expecting the other
party to rely and act thereon, and the other party
reasonably does so and suffers loss in that transaction, the represen tor can be held responsible if the
other elements of fraud are also present.
There is no question but that Anderson was in a superior position to know the facts.

He knew that plaintiff's judgment had

been docketed as a judgment lien against his real property in
Sevier County.

His statement regarding the effect of bankrupt·

cy was clearly made with the expectation that plaintiff would
rely thereon and plaintiff did so rely.

In making the state-

ment, Anderson was either careless or negligent.

Plaintiff

does not challenge the Court's observation that "the plaintiff
is obligated to take reasonable steps to inform himself."
Plaintiff submits however that plaintiff did so under the circumstances.

Defendant Anderson travelled from Salina, Utah to

Salt Lake City to resolve the matter of plaintiff's judgment.
He told plaintiff about his financial condition.
plaintiff he was contemplating bankruptcy.

(18)

He told

Plaintiff and
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defendant discussed the matter for an hour-and-a-half.

As

stated in Pace v. Parrish, 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952):
The full measure of the plaintiffs' duty was to use
reasonable care and observation in connection with
these representations. Having done so, it does not
lie in defendant's mouth to say that they were too
gullible and shouldn't have believed him.
Plaintiff exercised reasonable care under the circumstances.
Defendant's statement regarding the bankruptcy was false and
misleading.
Even if defendant's misstatement were innocently made,
the contract resulting therefrom is voidable by plaintiff.

In

Seeger v. Odell, 115 P.2d 977 (Cal. 1941), Justice Traynor for
the California Supreme Court stated the following rules:
If . . . the opinion or legal conclusion misrepresents
the facts upon which it is based or implies the existence of facts which are none xis tent, it cons ti tu tes
an actionable misrepresentation . . . The fact that
an investigation would have revealed the falsity of
the misrepresentation will not alone bar his recovery
. . . and it is well established that he is not held
to constructive notice of a public record which would
reveal the true facts. 115 P.2d at 980.
If plaintiff's president knew that a judgment lien on
real property is not discharged by bankruptcy, defendant's
statement would mean to plaintiff that defendant owned no real
property subject to the judgment lien.

If plaintiff did not

know that a judgment lien on real property is not discharged by
bankruptcy, defendant's statement would mean that all debts,
including judgments and judgment liens would be discharged.

In

either event, the statement was misleading, even if innocently.
This Court should have held the defendant's statements
were misleading and that plaintiff was entitled to rescind or
void the agreement.
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(19)

CONCLUSION
· The facts as found by the trial court and the

eviden~

before the trial court and this Court require findings and
judgment that:
(lJ

Defendant's agreement to pay $2,200 in full satis-

faction of plaintiff's judgment was not supported by new consideration to support an accord and satisfaction.
(2)

Defendants had a duty to disclose to plaintiff their

interest in real property, that a portion thereof had been
sold, and that the proceeds which would otherwise be paid to
defendants were being held by the title company because of
plaintiff's judgment.
(3)

The representations made by defendant were misleading;

plaintiff was entitled to rescind the agreement entered into
based on the misleading statements.
Based on the foregoing, Sugarhouse Finance Company
prays for this Court to rehear this case and that this Court
reverse the order of the trial court.
DATED

this~

day of May, 1980.

Respectfully submitted,
MOYLE

&

DRAPER

Wayne G. Petty
Attorneys for Plaintiff
600 Deseret Plaza
Salt Lake City, Utah
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 6th _day of May, 1980, I
served a copy of the attached Petition for Rehearing and Brief
in Support of Petition for Rehearing by delivering a copy
thereof to the following, or by mailing a copy thereof in a
securely sealed, postage paid envelope to the following at the
address indicated:

H. Ralph Klemm, Esq.
Ten West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah

84101
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APPENDIX A
Testimony of Eugene L. Anderson at the hearing before Judge
Durham, March 13, 1979:
Q

[By Mr. Petty] What did you tell him [plaintiff's
president] with respect to the status of your bank
account and the amount of this check?

A

I told him that I would have to see to it that it
would clear.

Q

Did you tell him that?

A

I told him that the guy that is the bank president
down there is a friend of mine, and that we go
square dancing with him, and that there would be
no problem on the check. In fact, I have written
checks previously without the funds to cover them,
and they have always cleared the checks, you know,
whether I have the funds in there or not.

Q

You did tell him, though, that at the time this
check was written there weren't sufficient funds
to cover the check?

A

That's correct.
(Tr. 5.)

Q

[By Mr. Klemm] Mr. Anderson, will you tell us
specifically what arrangements were made with the
bank with regard to the $2200 check that was given
to Mr. Petty?

A

I just told Rex that I may need some money and
could he loan me some more money, and he said, "We
will take care of it when you need it." And that's
basically all it was.

Q

Did you have other arrangements as well with your
friend at the bank in regards to checks that would
come in that weren't covered by funds in the bank?

A

Never had an arrangement, but in three years--and
I have written, I don't know, not too many, but
several checks that the funds weren't in there-but the bank has cleared every check. I have never
had a check come back unpaid.
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Q

Did .you have an understanding with the bank in
regards to that?

A

We had never talked about it.
for me.

They just did that

(Tr. 13-14.)

Q

[By Mr. Petty)
Now, with respect to the bank, and
the bank's honoring of this check, did you advise
the bank that you had issued a check on your account1

A

All I did was--like I said, all I did was tell Rex
that I may need some more money, and would it be
possible to get another loan.
And he says, "When
you need it, we will take care of it."

Q

Did that mean you would have to go back in and talk
to him again?

A

No.
(Tr. 20.)

1
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